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FROM THE INTERNET TO COURT: EXERCISING
JURISDICTION OVER WORLD WIDE WEB
COMMUNICATIONS
Gwenn M. Kalow*
INTRODUCTION
Caitlin, the owner of the "Enchanted Florist" flower shop in New
York City, decides to create and maintain a World Wide Web site on
the Internet to enable her customers to order flowers for delivery in
New York City and its surrounding suburbs. On this World Wide Web
site, she posts photographs of her more popular flower arrangements,
and takes orders over the phone from regular customers with account
numbers. Approximately one month later, Caitlin receives notice that
Ohio and Florida flower shop owners-of shops named the "En-
chanted Florist"-are suing her in those respective states. Caitlin is
stunned that these "Enchanted Florist" shop owners would sue her,
especially because she never conducted or tried to conduct business in
Ohio or Florida. Although Caitlin knew that the World Wide Web
site could be accessed anywhere in the world, she assumed that only
her regular account-bearing customers would actually visit the site, es-
pecially because flowers cannot be ordered without a customer
number.
As it turns out, the courts in these two states employed a different
jurisdictional test to determine whether it was appropriate to force
Caitlin to defend the suit in that state. Ironically, the Florida court
exercised personal jurisdiction, but the Ohio court did not. This situa-
tion perplexed Caitlin: How could one court exercise jurisdiction and
another decline, while the two claims were virtually identical? Caitlin
now faces a difficult situation: She is being asked to defend a suit in
Florida, a distant forum in which she has never conducted business,
visited, or even intended to visit. How can a business owner like Cait-
lin operate a Web site and prevent states from exercising jurisdiction?
What inconsistencies in Ohio's and Florida's personal jurisdiction tests
led to the disparate results? These difficult questions affect many In-
ternet users, and these users must feel confident that information they
post on the Internet will not be sufficient to subject them to suit in any
forum unless the Internet user has some intention of reaching that
particular forum.'
* This Note would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance of
Professor Tracy E. Higgins of the Fordham University School of Law. I would also
like to thank my family and friends for their continued patience, support, and
encouragement.
1. For a detailed examination of a hypothetical case on personal jurisdiction and
the Internet, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Vill. L Rev. 1,
19-25 (1996) (describing the nature of Web transmissions and how they relate to In-
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The Internet community-which includes children, adults, corpora-
tions, government, and other organizations electronically connected
using computers and modems-has recently experienced exponential
growth.2 The Internet serves as an electronic means of transmitting
information between members of its community. Occasionally, those
members engage in improper conduct on the Internet, from violating
a criminal statute to publishing defamatory material, that gives rise to
potential criminal or civil liability. These illicit Internet communica-
tions, void of territorial boundaries, present numerous challenges to
traditional personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Contacts initiated over
the Internet are not actually conducted in a particular location, but
rather in the ephemeral world of "Cyberspace." Courts have not only
been faced with the challenge of deciding whether to apply new juris-
dictional rules to Internet-related disputes, but also have encountered
difficulties in properly analyzing these cases within traditional per-
sonal jurisdiction decisional models.
The challenges presented by the Internet in jurisdictional disputes
can be properly addressed within the traditional personal jurisdiction
framework.' Courts, however, must ensure that a non-resident de-
fendant has purposefully availed himself of the laws of the forum in
which the court sits before finding that a communication over the In-
ternet is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process. The na-
ture of on-line communications mandates this analysis: In many
circumstances, users who "publish" information on the Internet do
not direct their communications at a particular community,5 and have
little or no control over who accesses their information. The availabil-
ity of worldwide access to information on the Internet should not suf-
fice to subject an individual to a lawsuit in any forum. There must be
a uniform jurisdictional test used by all courts to determine whether
particular Internet communications are sufficient to subject non-resi-
ternet jurisdictional theories). While Professor Perritt lays out different possible sce-
narios and analogous cases for Web jurisdictional disputes, see id. at 13-25, this Note
focuses on the need for a strict, uniform approach among courts when analyzing In-
ternet contacts.
2. See Curt A. Canfield & Joseph Labbe, Web or Windows?: Planning for In-
ternet/Intranet Technology-Explosive Growth Experienced, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 21, 1997,
at S2. The increased use of the Internet is due in part to increased advertising and
ease of obtaining access. See Christopher Wolf & Scott Shorr, Cybercops Are Crack-
ing Down on Internet Fraud. Federal and State Officials Have Stepped Up Efforts in
the Battle Against Info-Highway Robbery, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B12.
3. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328,1332-33 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
4. See Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in
the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 Alb. LJ. Sci. & Tech. 339, 380 (1996) ("The
existing body of jurisdictional jurisprudence is equipped to deal with the unique sce-
narios that arise when a non-resident defendant's contacts with a forum are isolated
electronic travels.").
5. Unlike Caitlin, who established her Web site only to sell flowers to her local
customers, individuals who do not direct their communications establish Web sites
without intending to reach any specific geographical community.
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dent defendants to a forum's jurisdiction. This test should establish a
strict standard to ensure that the non-resident defendants intended for
their Internet communications to reach the forum. Accordingly, this
Note proposes that courts confronting the issue of whether to exercise
personal jurisdiction for Internet-related activity, specifically in the
context of World Wide Web communications, should follow a
purposeful availment approach as outlined in Justice O'Connor's plu-
rality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court.6 Use of this
test would ensure that jurisdiction will be conferred only when In-
ternet communications intended to, and did, reach residents of the
forum state.
Part I of this Note provides a description and overview of the In-
ternet. It first introduces some services available on the Internet and
then describes the Internet's popular communication tool, the World
Wide Web. Finally, part I discusses some common uses of the In-
ternet. Part II provides an overview of current personal jurisdiction
analyses and outlines cases of particular importance to this Note's
proposed analysis of Internet-related personal jurisdiction issues. Part
III examines the divergent case law that has grappled with the issue of
whether to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on
his on-line conduct. After detailing the advantages and deficiencies of
alternative jurisdictional analyses, part IV proposes that courts use the
"purposeful availment" approach in World Wide Web jurisdictional
cases. Under this approach, courts should exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a non-resident defendant World Wide Web site operator
only when that defendant intentionally directed the information on
the World Wide Web to the forum state or a national/international
market.
This Note concludes that proper application of the purposeful avail-
ment approach to Internet activity in all forums will result in fair juris-
dictional results by preventing Internet users from being at the mercy
of plaintiff forum shopping and by ensuring that non-resident defend-
ants are subject to suit only in those jurisdictions with which they in-
tend to communicate.
I. BACKGROUND
The Internet currently consists of thirteen million host computers7
in ninety countries linked by more than fifty thousand connected com-
puter networks.8 The information and data found on the Internet are
located on individual computers throughout the world, and are not
6. 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see infra note 83.
7. David Aubrey, Bandwidth Blues, Computer Shopper, Feb. 1997, at 594. An
Internet host is a computer system that (1) has a unique numerical address that no
other computer uses, and (2) can both originate and receive information in the format
the network requires. Bryan Pfaffenberger, World Wide Web Bible 36 (2d ed. 1996).
8. See Shea ex reL Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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controlled by any single entity.' Approximately thirty to sixty million
individuals currently have access to the resources found on the In-
ternet, and that number is expected exceed one hundred million by
1998.10
Numerous avenues exist through which individuals can join the In-
ternet community. Many obtain access to the Internet through an ed-
ucational institution or employer directly linked to the Internet."
Others rely on Internet service providers1 2 or commercial on-line
services. 13 Regardless of the source through which an individual ob-
tains access, once a person is on-line, he may take advantage of a vari-
ety of services. Some of these services are explained below.
A. Services on the Internet
New Internet users commonly first utilize the Internet to communi-
cate with other members of the Internet community.' 4 Electronic
mail, or e-mail, is one popular method employed to communicate with
others who use the Internet. In fact, approximately thirty-five million
9. Id at 926.
10. Jill H. Ellsworth & Matthew V. Ellsworth, Marketing on the Internet 5 (2d ed.
1997) (quoting Vimton Cerf, an early Internet developer, testifying to the United
States House of Representatives).
11. Steve O'Keefe, Publicity on the Internet 29-30 (1997).
12. Internet service providers, often commercial entities charging access fees, pro-
vide modem access to computers linked directly to the Internet. Shea, 930 F. Supp. at
926; Robin Frost, What Does it Cost?, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R10.
13. Commercial on-line services provide access to both the Internet and materials
on the services' own proprietary networks. Some well-known commercial on-line
services include America Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy. See Shea, 930 F. Supp. at
926; Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 100-05. The nation's largest commercial on-line
service, America Online, has become so popular that it can accommodate only 3.5%
of its subscribers at one time. David S. Hilzenrath, At This Rate, They'll Be Swamped,
Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1997, at D1, D3; see David M. Herszenhorn, Connecticut Man
Finds E-Mail 'Date' Isn't a Girl, Isn't 13 and Has a Badge, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1996,
at 3 (stating that America Online is the nation's largest commercial Internet access
provider). The unavailability of this service to subscribers, who paid for unlimited
access, has led attorneys general of approximately 35 states to settle a dispute with
America Online so that the company will issue refunds to customers, which is ex-
pected to total as much as $25 million. David Hilzenrath & Jennifer Ordonez, AOL to
Give Refunds to Subscribers, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1997, at Al, A12. Despite America
Online's difficulties, commercial on-line services as a whole are currently the most
popular way of accessing the Internet. See Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 100.
14. Internet users form relationships through these on-line interactions that differ
from real-world communications. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace:
Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 Wake Forest L. Rev.
197, 199 (1995) ("Activity in cyberspace ... creates new relationships among individu-
als that differ from their analogues in the more usual, physical existence. These new
relationships strain legal principles and categories that currently direct judicial power
over individual action, either civilly or criminally."). One use of the Web, unlike real-
world communications, is the personal Web page, through which individuals can eas-
ily transmit photographs and messages that are accessible anywhere in the world. See
infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
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individuals worldwide use e-mail. 15 E-mail, however, is only one of
many resources available to Internet users wishing to communicate
with others.
Internet users with particular interests often join listservs, which are
electronic mailing lists arranged by interest group.16 Interest groups
also form through Usenet Newsgroups, which are electronic bulletin
boards arranged by interest group, where users freely post messages
relating to the particular topic of interest. 7
While e-mail, listservs, and Usenet groups are still used individually
by many Internet users, the World Wide Web (the "Web") integrates
all of these services with an easy-to-use graphical interface. Because
the Web provides Internet users with an interface allowing them to
access information based on content, regardless of the physical loca-
tion from which the site operator manages the Web site, it provides a
paradigmatic model for evaluating personal jurisdiction problems for
Internet communications.
B. The World Wide Web
The Web is an area of the Internet that has recently exploded in
popularity.' 8 It is a popular medium through which users locate and
access information on the Internet. 9 The Web combines communica-
tive tools with a friendly graphical interface to increase the ease with
which an individual can find and access information and other
individuals.20
Information made available on the Web is said to be "published."'"
Publishing on the Web merely requires an Internet-connected com-
15. Online Law: The SPA's Legal Guide to Doing Business on the Internet 411
(Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996) [hereinafter Online Law].
16. See Jonathan Rosenoer, CyberLaw: The Law of the Internet 342 (1997).
17. See Ellsworth & Ellsworth, supra note 10, at 77. See generally Daniel P. Dern,
The Internet Guide for New Users 195-211 (1994) (describing the origins, uses, and
diverse offerings of Usenet groups).
18. For more detailed information about the Web and its history, see Pfaffen-
berger, supra note 7, at 53-63; see also About the World Wide Web (visited Feb. 2,
1997) <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/WWW> (on file with the Fordham Law Re-
view) (describing the Web's origin and history).
19. Shea ex reL Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The World Wide Web exists
fundamentally as a platform through which people and organizations can communi-
cate through shared information.").
20. The Web is a means of creating a "geographically distributed pool of informa-
tion" so that Internet users can make information available to others regardless of the
actual physical distance separating them. Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 1 (emphasis
omitted).
21. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837. "By creating a page on the [Web], a single individ-
ual can essentially publish a document-a letter, a speech, a photograph or even a
movie-anywhere and everywhere across the globe." Thomas E. Weber, How Do I
Create My Own Home Page?, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at R25.
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puter that runs the proper server software.' Any Internet user, from
an individual working on a home computer to a large corporation us-
ing sophisticated computer systems, can publish information on the
Web.
Individuals who create their own Web sites, called site operators,
publish information on the Web through their respective sites.2 3 This
information, once published on a Web site, is accessible internation-
ally to anyone with Internet access.24 Any entity with Internet access,
including corporations, educational institutions, or other organiza-
tions, can function as site operators.2 5
Because of the ease with which a Web site can be created, the qual-
ity and accuracy of the information on a particular Web site is far from
guaranteed.26 A federal district court recently noted that, "[t]he Web,
as a universe of network accessible information, contains a variety of
documents prepared with quite varying degrees of care, from the hast-
ily typed idea, to the professionally executed corporate profile. '2 7
Despite the inconsistent quality of Web sites, the Web nevertheless
remains a powerful tool for accessing information.28 This power
"stems from the ability of a link to point to any document, regardless
of its status or physical location. 29
Users access information on the Web by pointing and clicking on
"hyperlinks," sometimes called "links," which are underlined phrases
that users click on to move "seamlessly between documents, regard-
less of their location."3 Links may take a user from the original Web
site to another site on a different Internet-connected computer.3
22. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837; see Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 589-90.
23. See Louise Kehoe, Time on Your Side, Fmn. Times, Nov. 13, 1996, at 14 (ex-
plaining that site operators publish information to Web users' computers).
24. See Weber, supra note 21, at R25.
25. See generally id (describing the ease with which a home page can be con-
structed and operated).
26. See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 124 (16th ed. 1996) (noting
the "transient nature" of Internet sources).
27. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 837 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see Wolf & Shorr, supra
note 2, at B12 (explaining that promoters of fraudulent schemes and deceptive adver-
tisers have started doing business on the Internet, partly because of the inexpensive
start-up costs).
28. See David J. Goldstone, Legal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Locating the Seams
on the Web, Wash. Legal Found., Jan. 24, 1997, at 1 (stating that the World Wide Web
"has enabled people to make contacts, obtain information, communicate with others,
and conduct business all over the world, with remarkable ease").
29. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837.
30. Shea ex rel. Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see
Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 2, 12. Hyperlinks, usually boldfaced or underlined to
be distinguished from the surrounding text, function as computer-activated cross-ref-
erences. Id. The text of each Web page screen often includes highlighted and under-
lined text, which, when selected, takes the user to another part of the Web site or
another Web site. See O'Keefe, supra note 11, at 108.
31. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 836.
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An Internet user traveling from site to site is exploring an on-line
world with no physical boundaries.32 Indeed, "[t]he Internet is not a
physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which intercon-
nects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks. It is
thus a network of networks. 33 When exploring the Web, for exam-
ple: "You might hook up to a computer in the next building, a differ-
ent city, or a far-away country-all the mechanics are hidden from
your view. Suddenly, the Internet's riches are at your fingertps (and
you don't need a computer science degree to access them)."-IV
C. Uses of the World Wide Web
Numerous uses of the Web exist to satisfy the diverse user base that
constitutes the Internet community. These uses, and the entities tak-
ing advantage of them, are critical to personal jurisdiction analysis.
Businesses take advantage of the Internet in a variety of ways.
Many commercial entities use Web sites to solicit purchases or to in-
form potential customers about the business' services and goods.35
For example, major corporations like Pepsi and General Motors use
Web sites for promotional purposes.36 Internet users may visit Web
sites to obtain information about particular businesses. In fact, many
for-profit and not-for-profit entities provide information about their
organizations on the Web.37 Retailers have also used Web sites as a
virtual shopping mall, allowing users to purchase their products from
the user's computer. For example, consumers can currently purchase
clothing,38 computer software39 or compact discs40 on the Web from
the comfort of their living room through their home computer.
32. David Bender, Emerging Personal Jurisdiction Issues on the Internet, at 7, 17
(453 PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series
No. G4-3961, 1996); Online Law, supra note 15, at 365.
33. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830.
34. Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 2.
35. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842; see Robin Frost, Watching the Web, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 9, 1996, at R30 (describing 19 Web sites).
36. See Pepsi World (visited Feb. 2, 1997) <http:J/www.pepsLcom/> (on file with
the Fordham Law Review); General Motors: People in Motion (visited Feb. 2, 1997)
<http://www.gm.com/index.cgi> (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
37. Time Warner's Web site is an excellent example; the site provides information
about the corporation's many divisions. See Tune Warner Factfinder (visited Feb. 2,
1997) <http://pathflnder.com/Corp> (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
38. See, e.g., Welcome Eddie Bauer (visited Feb. 2, 1997) <http'/Ivwv.ebauer.com/
> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (allowing Web users to purchase clothing
and learn about Eddie Bauer).
39. See, e.g., Cyber Exchange (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <httpl//wvw.cyberexchange.-
com/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (selling new and used computer
software on the Web).
40. See, e.g., Columbia House Online (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http:/I
www.columbiahouse.com/> (on file with the Fordhamn Law Review) (selling, among
other things, compact discs on the Web).
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Educational institutions are also joining the Web bandwagon, using
the Web to provide information about their schools. Universities, for
example, may have Web pages providing information about their
school or library catalogs.41 Additionally, many Web pages, created
by either organizations or individuals, cater to particular recreational
interests. There are currently Web pages dedicated to almost every
conceivable hobby, including in-line skating,42 theater,43 bridge,44 and
cooking.45 Enthusiasts of almost any endeavor enjoy both communi-
cating with other users and the ease of access to up-to-date informa-
tion about their hobby.
Many individuals have personal Web pages containing any informa-
tion that the individual site operator wishes to publish on the In-
ternet.46 These pages, for example, function as: a resume available to
any Internet user,47 a display of favorite photographs,48 or hyperlinks
to the individual's favorite sites.49 Although an individual may obtain
Internet access from an educational institution, employer, Internet
service provider, or commercial on-line service, he still acts as a site
operator if he maintains a personal Web page.
The Web provides a flexible means through which Internet users
can access information.5 0 Most Internet users explore the Web una-
ware of the geographical location of other Internet users with whom
they are communicating.51 As Steven A. Zalesin, a partner at the law
firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP commented: "The
41. See, e.g., Fordham: New York City's Jesuit University (visited Feb. 3, 1997)
<http://www.fordham.edu/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (Fordham Uni-
versity Home Page); Penn (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://www.upenn.edu/> (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (University of Pennsylvania Home Page).
42. See, e.g., NYCISG: The New York City Inline Skating Guide (visited Feb. 3,
1997) <http://www.skatecity.conmNYCcover.html> (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (providing information for New York's inline skating community).
43. See, e.g., Playbill On-Line (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <httpl/piano.symgrp.com/
playbill/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (updating theater lovers on the
latest news).
44. See, e.g., Okbridge: Bridge on the Internet (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://
www.okbridge.com/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (allowing bridge players
to play bridge live on the Internet for a small fee).
45. See, e.g., The Taste of the Web (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://
www.epicurious.com/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (distributing recipes
on the Web).
46. For more information on how to create a Web site, see Pfaffenberger, supra
note 7, at 573-87.
47. See, e.g., The Board (visited Feb. 4, 1997) <http:/iTheBoard.com/> (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (providing resume postings and home pages to Web users).
48. See, e.g., Welcome to Ben's Rally Page (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://
www.reed.edu/-bradley/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (displaying photo-
graphs of Rally cars).
49. See, e.g., Cosma's Home Page, (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://
www.physics.wisc.edu:80/-shalizi/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (providing
numerous hyperlinks to other Web sites).
50. Pfaffenberger, supra note 7, at 2.
51. Bender, supra note 32, at 17.
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possibility of being dragged into court in states where no business is
conducted is 'a little scary from the standpoint of an Internet Web site
operator and advertiser .... They certainly are not willingly subject-
ing themselves to the laws in every state in the U.S.' "I Given the
inconsistent approaches followed under the traditional personal juris-
diction framework, applying this framework to the various means and
methods of exploring and publishing on the Web to prevent the unjust
assertion of jurisdiction over Web site operators is a formidable task.
The conflicting traditional methods of analyzing personal jurisdiction
must be examined before integrating the appropriate doctrine to Web
communications.
I. PERSONAL JuRisDIcrION
Personal jurisdiction is the geographical restriction on where a
plaintiff may elect to sue a defendant for a particular claim.53 The
restriction is intended to prevent a plaintiff from suing a defendant in
a jurisdiction foreign to the defendant, unless that defendant has es-
tablished some relationship with that forum that would lead him to
reasonably anticipate being sued there.5
General jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are two distinct meth-
ods by which a court can assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resi-
dent defendant. A court exercises general jurisdiction when it holds
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who is present in the fo-
rum.5 To assert general jurisdiction, the defendant must participate
in substantial forum-related activity.56 When a non-resident defend-
ant's actions in a forum state give rise to long-arm jurisdiction over
the defendant,5 a court may assert specific jurisdiction over the non-
resident.
Unlike specific jurisdiction, general jurisdiction requires the defend-
ant to have substantial threshold contacts with the forum state.58 Ex-
52. Dominic Bencivenga, Cyberspace in Court: Arguments Are Part Tradition,
Part Imagination, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 21, 1996, at 5 (quoting Steven A. Zalesin of Patter-
son, Belknap, Webb & Tyler LLP).
53. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
54. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 100-01; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
55. A court exercises general jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts be-
tween the defendant and the state or when there is "a defendant in a suit not arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum." Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9 (1984).
56. Jack IL Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure § 3.10, at 124 (2d ed. 1993); 4
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067, at 296
(2d ed. 1987).
57. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
58. Friedenthal et al., supra note 56, § 3.10, at 124; see, e.g., Helicopteros, 466 U.S.
at 415-16 (holding that defendant's contacts with Texas were insufficient to assert gen-
eral jurisdiction because the contacts did not constitute continuous and systematic
activity).
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ercising general jurisdiction is constitutionally permissible as long as
the defendant is commonly present in the forum, regardless of
whether the defendant's contacts with the forum are directly related
to the cause of action. 9 The inquiry for specific jurisdiction, unlike
that for general jurisdiction, involves a fact-specific determination of
whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defend-
ant comports with due process, given the specific facts of the case.60
Thus far, at least one court has refused to apply principles of gen-
eral jurisdiction to contacts over the Internet.61 The court refused to
assert general jurisdiction based on Internet activity because elec-
tronic communications on the Internet are not considered sufficient to
justify a finding of general jurisdiction. 62 Courts have addressed the
Internet jurisdictional issue in the context of asserting specific jurisdic-
tion pursuant to a state's long-arm statute instead of through general
jurisdiction.63
A. Specific Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statutes
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 64 sets the
outermost limits of a state's power to exercise personal jurisdiction.65
The legislature of each state, however, has the power to impose fur-
ther limitations beyond the Due Process Clause by granting its courts
the power to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents through
long-arm statutes.
66
59. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
60. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (explaining that "the facts
of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite 'affiliating circum-
stances' are present" (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958))).
61. See, e.g., McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826,
1828 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing
computer interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction
would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently exists ....
Thus, [having] a Web site used by Californians cannot establish jurisdiction by
itself.").
62. See id.
63. Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, Avoiding Remote Jurisdiction Based
on Internet Web Sites, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 10, 1996, at 1, 4.
64. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
65. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984);
Friedenthal et al., supra note 56, § 3.1, at 94.
66. Friedenthal et al., supra note 56, § 3.1, at 94. Long-ann statutes are
[v]arious state legislative acts which provide for personal jurisdiction, via
substituted service of process, over persons or corporations which are non-
residents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, directly or by
agent, or communicate with persons in the state, for limited purposes, in
actions which concern claims relating to the performance or execution of
those purposes ....
Black's Law Dictionary 942 (6th ed. 1990); see Gregory P. McMahon, Comment, Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in a Dissolution of Marriage Action: Garrett v. Garrett, 21 Nova L.
Rev. 491, 504 (1996).
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Some states enumerate in their long-arm statutes the types of con-
tacts with the forum state necessary to authorize courts to exercise
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. 67 Types of contacts enu-
merated in New York, for example, include transacting business
within the forum, committing a tortious act within the forum, or being
a defendant in a matrimonial or family action who previously resided
in the forum.68
Other state legislatures have granted their state courts the authority
to confer jurisdiction to the full extent permissible under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.69 In these states, the personal jurisdiction analyses col-
lapse into one: If a court has constitutional jurisdictional power, it
also has statutory power to assert jurisdiction. After determining that
a particular lawsuit falls within the state's long-arm statute, a court
next employs an independent analysis to ensure that the nature of the
contacts satisfies the due process analysis.
B. Due Process Analysis for Specific Jurisdiction
The two-part due process test for specific jurisdiction is fact-specific,
requiring that courts first analyze the defendant's pre-litigation con-
nections with the forum, and then determine whether exercising juris-
diction over the defendant is fair and reasonable.70 The Court first set
forth this standard in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,7 when it
was forced to determine whether subjecting a non-resident defendant
to personal jurisdiction passed due process muster.7
1. Minimum Contacts
The first prong of the due process analysis inquires into the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum prior to litigation. The International
Shoe test mandates that, in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction
if not present in the forum, a non-resident defendant must "have cer-
tain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
67. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 302(a) (McKinney 1990) (stating that conduct
within the long-arm statute includes committing a tortious act within the forum state
or transacting business within the forum); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322(a) (Purdon
1981) (providing that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant when the non-resident, among other things, transacts business, supplies
services, contracts to insure, or causes tortious injury in Pennsylvania).
68. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
69. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (West 1973) (stating that "a court of
this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States."); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-5-33 (1985) ("[T]he courts
of this state shall hold [non-resident defendants] amenable to suit in Rhode Island in
every case not contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United
States.").
70. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-78 (1985).
71. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
72. Id. at 316.
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justice.' ",73 The minimum contacts test recognizes that due process
limitations require that non-resident defendants have minimum con-
tacts with the forum state such that they would reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.74
The International Shoe minimum contacts test is somewhat vague
because it leaves room for courts to interpret and apply the individual
facts of each case to determine what contacts are sufficient. This
vagueness, however, has its virtues: It allows courts to make individ-
ual judgments about what is reasonable and fair in ways that bright
line tests do not.75 The test's tension "between notions of territoriality
and fairness continues to create incoherent and uncertain case law." '76
2. Reasonableness
The second prong of the due process analysis examines the reasona-
bleness of exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
Simply put, defendants must be able to reasonably anticipate the pos-
sibility of being haled into court in a given jurisdiction so that exercis-
ing jurisdiction "does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' ,,77 The Court has established the following five
factors to consider in the reasonableness analysis: (1) "the burden on
the defendant" of defending a lawsuit in the forum,78 (2) "the forum
State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,' 79 (3) "the plaintiff's inter-
est in obtaining convenient and effective relief," 80 (4) the "interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,"'" and (5) the "shared interest of the several states in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' S
The due process analysis for personal jurisdiction is meant to pro-
tect individuals from being subject to suit in any forum selected by a
plaintiff. By carefully considering the interests of both the forum and
the defendant, it allows courts to properly balance factual factors to
73. Id (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also Rex R.
Perschbacher, Foreword: Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past and Future of
Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 513, 515-18 (1995) (explaining the mini-
mum contacts test established in International Shoe).
74. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
75. Perschbacher, supra note 73, at 529 (summarizing views on the impact of Inter-
national Shoe on current jurisdictional issues).
76. Id at 528. Indeed, Perschbacher argues that the test "has never completely
fulfilled its promise to provide an adequate general theory of state-court jurisdiction."
Id. at 514 (footnote omitted). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of
State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241, 288 (stating that the minimum con-
tacts principle provides an adequate theory of state-court jurisdiction).
77. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S.
at 316).
78. Id
79. lid
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id.
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ensure the fair and just exercise of jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant. Advances in technology, however, mandate that courts
take into account the implications of our rapidly modernizing world.
Looking at the effects of modernization would ensure that personal
jurisdiction will be exercised only when the non-resident defendant
both utilized advanced tools and actually intended to conduct business
or communicate with individuals in certain forums; mere awareness
that citizens of numerous other forums could intercept communica-
tions cannot be sufficient.
B. Personal Jurisdiction Analyses Relevant to Cybercommunications
Courts currently use jurisdictional analysis models established by
the Supreme Court to analyze Web jurisdictional issues. A number of
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decisions are particularly rele-
vant to examining courts' attempts to establish a framework for ana-
lyzing the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants based on Web communications. The particular personal
jurisdiction analysis courts apply when deciding whether to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-resident Web site operator will have
great consequences on all Web site operators in all jurisdictions. If
Web site operators are subject to jurisdiction in a foreign forum sim-
ply because they published on the Web, then the fear of litigation not
only may cause individual site operators to remove their Web sites,
but may also lead to a sharp decrease in Web usage.
In Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court,83 the Court was faced
with the question of whether exercising personal jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant corporation based on its mere awareness that com-
ponents it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside of the United
States would reach the forum state through the stream of commerce,84
comports with due process.s A plurality of the Court endorsed a two-
prong analysis, first looking at whether the non-resident defendant de-
83. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Asahi Court's Justices, unable to articulate a major-
ity holding, failed to state a clear constitutional standard against which long-arm juris-
diction over non-resident defendants should be measured. Douglas Ulene, Recent
Developmen4 Jurisdiction: Personal Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations-Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 29 Harv. Int'l LI. 207, 213 (1988);
see also Yvonne Luketich Blauvelt, Case Comment, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 49 Ohio St. I.. 853, 868 (1988)
("The Supreme Court in Asahi ignored the opportunity to provide a federal standard
to decide issues of personal jurisdiction in the international context."). The plurality's
purposeful availment analysis has been adopted, at least in theory, by many jurisdic-
tions. The problem, however, is that exactly what purposeful availment entails is still
unresolved.
84. See infra note 88 for a definition of the stream of commerce test.
85. In other words: Did this awareness satisfy the minimum contacts test so that
exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable? Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
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liberately availed himself of the laws of the forum state,86 and next
deciding whether exercising jurisdiction over that defendant would be
fair and reasonable!' This approach ensures that non-resident de-
fendants will not be subject to jurisdiction for merely placing goods in
the "stream of commerce."'
The deliberate availment prong prevents courts from asserting juris-
diction merely because a non-resident defendant has some awareness
of a possible connection with the forum. Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion stated:
The "substantial connection[ ]" between the defendant and the fo-
rum State necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come
about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward theforum State. The placement of a product into the stream of com-
merce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully
directed toward the forum State.89
Conduct that fulfills the deliberate availment requirement includes
advertising or marketing in the forum state. 9° The plurality explained
that there must be clear evidence that the defendant sought to serve
the particular market. 91
In general, once courts find that the minimum contacts prong of the
due process analysis is satisfied, they must still evaluate the reasona-
bleness of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. The Asahi court
found that, when evaluating the reasonableness of asserting jurisdic-
tion, courts must weigh and consider the burden on the defendant to
litigate in the forum, the forum state's interests in the matter, the in-
terest of the plaintiff in obtaining relief, efficiency in resolving the con-
flict in the forum, and the interests of several states in furthering
certain fundamental social policies.92 Eight of the nine Asahi justices
agreed that, regardless of whether there are sufficient minimum con-
86. Id at 112. This Note argues that purposeful availment requires more than
awareness that the World Wide Web site could easily be accessed in a particular fo-
rum; rather, purposeful availment entails actually directing the site to particular juris-
dictions. See infra part IV.B (discussing how purposeful availment should be applied
to World Wide Web jurisdictional cases).
87. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16.
88. Stream of commerce is the "[t]erm used to describe goods which remain in
interstate commerce though held within a state for a short period of time.... In
Commerce Clause analysis, local activities which are part of the current or stream of
interstate commerce are considered part of the interstate movement." Black's Law
Dictionary 1421 (6th ed. 1990).
89. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (citations omitted).
90. Id For example, a corporation's Web site that offers special products and
prices for New York residents who mention a special "Web offer" when ordering
would be marketing or advertising over the Web to New York residents; the corpora-
tion thereby would be taking advantage of New York residents for financial gain.
This conduct would constitute deliberate availment for any lawsuit initiated by a New
York resident arising from the special offer.
91. Id
92. Id. at 113.
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tacts, exercising jurisdiction over the defendant in this case would be
unreasonable. NI
In his concurrence in Asahi, Justice Brennan argued that merely
sending a product into the stream of commerce is sufficient to satisfy
the purposeful availment requirement in any state. 4 Justice Brennan
explained that a "defendant who has placed goods in the stream of
commerce... benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facili-
tate commercial activity. '95 Therefore, Justice Brennan's approach
endorses asserting jurisdiction whenever a product is accessible in a
forum, regardless of the defendant's intent to place the product in that
particular forum. 96
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc, 9 7 another case with potential
ramifications in the Web jurisdictional context, Hustler's regular circu-
lation of magazines in the forum state was held to be sufficient to
support asserting jurisdiction in a libel action based on the magazine's
content.98 The Court found that the combination of New Hampshire's
interest in redressing injuries that occur within the State, and its inter-
est in cooperating with other States in the application of the "single
publication rule," illustrates the propriety of requiring the defendant
to answer to a multi-state libel action in New Hampshire.99 The Court
concluded:
Where, as in this case, respondent Hustler Magazine, Inc., has con-
tinuously and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it
must reasonably anticipate being haled into court there in a libel
action based on the contents of its magazine. And, since respondent
can be charged with knowledge of the "single publication rule," it
must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages. Re-
spondent produces a national publication aimed at a nationwide au-
dience. There is no unfairness in calling it to answer for the
contents of that publication wherever a substantial number of cop-
ies are regularly sold and distributed. 100
93. Id. at 105, 113-16.
94. Md at 117. Justice Brennan concurred with Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. I& at 116. The divergence of opinions in Asahi has led to confusion about
exactly what constitutes "minimum contacts": "The sharp fragmentation of the Court
in Asahi has obscured the content of the minimum contacts doctrine.... [L]ower
courts are seemingly free to experiment with the constitutional standard on a case-by-
case basis." Ulene, supra note 83, at 213.
95. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117.
96. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that there is no need for additional
conduct beyond the placement of a product into the stream of commerce).
97. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
98. Id. at 773-74. In Keeton, a New York plaintiff brought a libel suit in New
Hampshire against Hustler, an Ohio corporation. Hustler's only connection with New
Hampshire was monthly sales of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its nation-
ally published magazine. Id. at 772. The plaintiff chose New Hampshire because of
it's longer statute of limitations. Id. at 773-75.
99. I& at 777-78.
100. It at 781 (citation omitted).
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Therefore, because it sold magazines nationwide, Hustler was at the
mercy of the plaintiff's forum selection.1 1 Applying Keeton to In-
ternet personal jurisdiction cases could lead to this kind of dangerous
forum selection based on the worldwide accessibility of Web sites.'0
III. ON-LINE LAwsuITs
In the past two years, numerous decisions have emerged that either
directly or closely confront the issue of whether on-line contacts are
sufficient to subject a non-resident defendant to personal jurisdiction.
These decisions have followed traditional personal jurisdiction analy-
ses, complying with the controlling constitutional analysis of the par-
ticular court's circuit or other superior court. As this Note reveals,
these analyses are inconsistent from state to state. Unless states apply
the same personal jurisdiction analysis to these cases-in particular an
analysis requiring purposeful availment towards the forum state-
Web site operators, like Caitlin, will never be able to predict what
conduct will be sufficient to force them to defend lawsuits in a foreign
jurisdiction. 0 3
A. Cases Establishing Personal Jurisdiction
Some decisions suggest that a court may obtain personal jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant whose sole contact with the forum state
arose through the Internet. This section discusses these decisions:
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,"°4 Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot
Corn, Inc.,105 Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,1°6 Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen,10 7 Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,108 and
Edias Software International, L.L. C v. Basis International Ltd. ' 0 9
In CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,10 Patterson, a CompuServe sub-
scriber, entered into a Shareware Registration Agreement ("SRA")
with CompuServe by which CompuServe stored and distributed Pat-
terson's software over the Internet in exchange for fifteen percent of
Patterson's sales."' Patterson and CompuServe entered into the SRA
101. The plaintiffs only connection with New Hampshire was Hustler's circulation
of the magazine that she helped produce. Id. at 772.
102. David A. Price, Lawsuits over Web Sites Plague Companies from Afar, Inves-
tor's Bus. Daily, Oct. 15, 1996, at A4. A situation like that in Keeton, where the
plaintiff chose the forum based on its longer statute of limitations, illustrates the
temptation and danger of forum shopping.
103. See supra Introduction (describing hypothetical situation).
104. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
105. No. Civ.A.96-397 Erie, 1997 WL 37657 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1997).
106. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
107. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
108. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
109. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
110. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
111. Idt at 1260-61. Under the SRA, CompuServe agreed to provide its subscribers
with access to Patterson's software products. The standardized SRA, and other
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electronically from Patterson's computer in Texas to CompuServe's
computer system in Ohio." 2 When CompuServe began marketing a
product similar to one of Patterson's, Patterson notified CompuServe
via e-mail that some terms CompuServe used in its similar product
were Patterson's common law trademarks. 13 CompuServe com-
menced a declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, a
declaration that it had not infringed on Patterson's common law
trademarks." 4 The United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.'" 5
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that
(1) Patterson purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing
business in Ohio by knowingly reaching out to CompuServe in Ohio
and benefiting from CompuServe's handling of the software and the
resulting fees;116 (2) the cause of action arose from Patterson's activi-
ties in Ohio; 1 7 and (3) Patterson, by employing a computer network
service like CompuServe to market his software, could reasonably ex-
pect disputes with CompuServe to yield lawsuits in CompuServe's
home state of Ohio" 8
In determining whether to assert specific jurisdiction over Patter-
son, the Sixth Circuit employed the three part test it uses for all per-
sonal jurisdiction issues, considering: (1) purposeful availment; (2)
whether the action arose out of defendant's activities in the forum
state; and (3) the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the
defendant." 9 Note the similarities between this test and Justice
O'Connor's Asahi approach-both tests look for intentional avail-
ment and reasonableness. 20 The Sixth Circuit's additional factor, that
the action arise out of forum activity, is applied to prevent the adjudi-
cation of claims totally unrelated to the state.
agreements that were incorporated into the SRA, provided that it was entered into in
Ohio and governed by Ohio law. Id.
112. ld.
113. 1& at 1261.
114. CompuServe Inc. v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at
*34 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
115. Id. at *21-22.
116. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1263-67.
117. Id. at 1267.
118. I. at 1268.
119. Id. at 1263.
120. Another jurisdictional case that involved non-Internet electronic communica-
tions has employed this test as well. Plus System, Inc. v. New England Network, Inc.,
804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992), involved a contract dispute between a Colorado-
based national Automatic Teller Machine ("ATM") network and a regional New Eng-
land ATM network based in Connecticut. Id. at 114. The United States District Court
for the District of Colorado applied Colorado's three-part test for analyzing personal
jurisdiction, which is identical to the test employed by the CompuServe court. Id at
118. The court assumed jurisdiction over the Connecticut defendants because, among
other things, the defendants knowingly signed an agreement with a Colorado com-
pany, their agreement contained a Colorado choice of law clause, and the defendants
were aware of digital contacts with computers located in Colorado. Id. at 118-19.
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Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,21 like CompuServe,
involved a non-resident defendant who conducted business over the
Internet. 122 In Zippo, defendant Dot Corn operated a Web site using
plaintiff's trademark "Zippo" as part of its domain name.123 This site
had approximately 140,000 subscribers worldwide to its Internet news
service; each subscriber submitted their address over the Web and
paid for the service by credit card.124 The site included an application
for its Internet news service." 5 After paying for the service, subscrib-
ers would enter a password to access the site. 26 Zippo sued Dot Com
in Pennsylvania alleging, among other claims, trademark infringement
and dilution. 27 The court exercised jurisdiction, holding that "Dot
Corn's conducting of electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents
constitute[d] the purposeful availment of doing business in
Pennsylvania.""
The court's due process analysis examined: (1) whether there were
sufficient minimum contacts; (2) whether the claim arose out of those
contacts; and (3) whether exercising jurisdiction would be reason-
able. 29 When analyzing the first prong, minimum contacts, the court
examined whether Dot Corn " 'purposefully established' " contacts
with Pennsylvania, and could reasonably foresee being haled into a
Pennsylvania court.130 This test looked at whether conducting elec-
tronic commerce over the Internet constituted purposeful availment
of doing business in Pennsylvania.13' This analysis is similar to Justice
O'Connor's Asahi approach, but apparently also considers the fore-
seeability of litigation with purposeful availment.
The court noted that Dot Corn freely chose to conduct business with
Pennsylvania residents by selling its services to them. 32 Further, Dot
Corn could have chosen not to sell its services to Pennsylvania resi-
121. No. Civ.A.96-397 Erie, 1997 WL 37657 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1997).
122. Id. at *1.
123. I& at *1-2. Domain names, or addresses, are similar to street addresses in that
through a domain name or address an Internet user can find another Internet user. If
a company uses a domain address that is identical to the name or trademark of an-
other company, an Internet user could inadvertently access the unintended company.
Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Conn. 1996). The
domain names at issue in Zippo were titled: "zippo.com," "zippo.net," and "zip-
ponews.com." Zippo, 1997 WL 37657, at *1.
124. 1&. The credit card payments were made over the Internet or by telephone. Id.
Note that, by asking for and receiving addresses, Dot Coin was aware of the geo-
graphical location of its subscribers. Additionally, by receiving credit card payments,
Dot Corn conducted business beyond the scope of the Internet communications.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id at *6.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
131. Id. at *6. The court declined to determine "whether Dot Coin's Web site
alone constitutes the purposeful availment of doing business in Pennsylvania." Id.
132. Id. at *7.
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dents, and knew that giving Pennsylvania subscribers a password
would result in the transmission of electronic messages into Penn-
sylvania.13 3 The fact that Dot Corn knew their subscribers' addresses
and credit card numbers substantially strengthened the availment ar-
gument because Dot Corn had the opportunity to reject applications
of residents of a given state.
In Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,13' Instruction Set, Inc.
("ISI"), a Massachusetts corporation, advertised its computer technol-
ogy goods and services over the Internet using the domain name "In-
set.Com."'1 35 Inset did not authorize ISI's use of its "Inset" trademark
in any capacity. 136 Nevertheless, ISI used Inset's trademark in both its
domain name and toll-free telephone number. 37 The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut held that advertising on
the Internet is solicitation of a sufficient repetitive nature to satisfy the
Connecticut long-arm statute, thereby conferring Connecticut's long-
arm jurisdiction upon ISI.138 In this case, the court examined contacts
arising from Internet advertising, rather than Internet business as in
CompuServe and Zippo. 39
The court's due process analysis considered whether (1) the defend-
ant could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum
state, and (2) notions of fair play and substantial justice were of-
fended."4 Interestingly, this analysis differs from Justice O'Connor's
Asahi approach because its first prong focuses on whether the defend-
ant could anticipate being haled into court rather than whether the
defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum state's
jurisdiction.14 '
The court explained that ISI had sufficient minimum contacts be-
cause it purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business
in Connecticut, noting that ISI's advertisements were continuously
available to any Internet user, which included as many as 10,000 in
133. Id. Because Dot Corn subscribers disclosed their address and credit card num-
bers to the corporation, Dot Corn could have chosen not to conduct business with
residents of any given forum.
134. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
135. Id. at 162-63; see supra note 123 (discussing domain names).
136. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
137. Id.
138. Id at 164.
139. See supra notes 116-18, 121-22 and accompanying text.
140. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164-65 (citations omitted).
141. Another court has employed this analysis in deciding whether to exercise juris-
diction based on electronic communications, although in a non-Internet context. In
Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, held that the fact that a
New York defendant contracted for information on a computer database located in
Florida is not sufficient to impose Florida jurisdiction. Id at 1352-53. The minimum
contacts test, like the test in Inset, focused on whether the defendant could reasonably
anticipate being haled into court in the forum. Id. at 1352.
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Connecticut alone.'42 Therefore, the advertisements satisfied the con-
stitutional precepts concerning due process.
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen,143 Toeppen registered
a Web site using "Panavision.com" as its domain name, preventing
Panavision from registering and using its own trademark as its In-
ternet domain. 44 After Panavision brought claims against Toeppen
under, among other things, federal and state dilution of trademark
and unfair competition law, Toeppen moved to dismiss for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 45
The court utilized the Ninth Circuit's three-part test for specific ju-
risdiction considering: (1) purposeful availment; (2) whether the
claim arose out of the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. 4 6 This is
the same jurisdictional test used by the Sixth Circuit in CompuServe
and is quite similar to Justice O'Connor's Asahi approach.
The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia held that it had specific jurisdiction over the Illinois defendant
Toeppen because the defendant's conduct both intended to, and did,
result in harmful effects in California. 47 The court noted, however,
that it was not holding that Toeppen was conducting business in Cali-
fornia over the Internet; rather, Toeppen was "running a scam di-
rected at California."'" The court commented further that " '[i]n this
era of fax machines and discount air travel,' requiring Toeppen to liti-
gate in California is not constitutionally unreasonable.' 1 49
In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc. ,' 50 the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant, Cybergold, committed trademark infringement and unfair
competition through its Web site and service.' 51 Cybergold moved to
dismiss claiming that the court lacked personal jurisdiction.152
Cybergold's Web site, based in California, can be accessed by any In-
ternet user in the world.' 53 The site provides information about
Cybergold's upcoming service which will provide Internet users with
electronic mailings of advertisements in each user's particular areas of
interest.'5 4 Plaintiff claimed that the site functioned as an advertise-
ment for Cybergold's upcoming service and invited both users and ad-
142. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165.
143. 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
144. Id. at 619. For a similar set of facts, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145. Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 619.
146. Id- at 620 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 622.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990)).
150. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
151. Id. at 1329. To view the Web site, see Cybergold: Get Ready (visited Feb. 5,
1997) <http://www.cybergold.com/> (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
152. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1329.
153. Id. at 1330.
154. Id This service was not operational as of the date of this court's opinion. Id.
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vertisers 5 5 from Missouri to receive or send information through its
mailing service. 156
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri's minimum contacts test required (1) that the defendant reason-
ably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state 57 and (2) that
maintenance of the suit not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice (i.e., it is not unreasonable).' 58 Both prongs must
be satisfied for sufficient contacts to exist.159 This test has an empha-
sis similar to the plurality's test in Asahi. The court measured the ac-
tual contacts to determine if the contacts satisfy the three prong test
by considering:
(1) the nature and quality of the contacts with the forum state; (2)
the quantity of those contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action
to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a
forum for its residents; [and] (5) the convenience of the parties. 60
The court held that Missouri's long-arm statute reached the defend-
ants because their activity may have produced an effect in Missouri by
allegedly causing Maritz economic injury.' 6 1 The court relied on the
"commission of a tortious act" provision of the Missouri long arm stat-
ute, finding that violating the Lanham Act is tortious in nature. 62
The court also held that asserting jurisdiction over the defendant did
not violate the defendant's due process rights. 63
The court first noted that Cybergold intended its Web site to reach
all Internet users, regardless of their geographic location."6 This
helped the court decide that Cybergold's contacts favored exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.'6 The court then held that
by transmitting information about its service into Missouri over one
hundred times, Cybergold purposely availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Missouri.'" The court also found that
Cybergold could not only anticipate litigation in a Missouri court,1 67
155. Advertisers would pay Cybergold to promote their products through the mail-
ing list. Id
156. I
157. Id. at 1332 (citation omitted). There must be some purposeful availment of
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum to satisfy this prong.
158. Id (citation omitted).
159. I
160. Id
161. Id. at 1331.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1332-34.
164. Id at 1333. The court noted that "Cybergold automatically and indiscrimi-
nately responds to each and every internet user who accesses its website [and] has
consciously decided to transmit advertising information to all internet users, knowing
that such information will be transmitted globally." Id
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1334.
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but that it was reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over Cybergold be-
cause requiring Cybergold to defend this suit in Missouri did not of-
fend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
In light of the aforementioned factors, as well as the quality and
nature of the contacts, the number of contacts (131), and Missouri's
and Maritz's interest in resolving this case in Missouri, the court held
that exercising personal jurisdiction over Cybergold did not violate
due process. 16 9
In Edias Software International, L.L.C. v. Basis International
Ltd.,170 Basis posted a press release stating that its reason for termi-
nating a contractual agreement with Edias was Edias's failure to sign
an agreement to ensure that it would provide Edias customers with
Basis's products at a fair price and with complete technical support
and product information.' 7' Using the Ninth Circuit's three-part spe-
cific jurisdiction test, articulated in Panavision,72 the court held that
an allegedly defamatory statement published on the Internet can es-
tablish personal jurisdiction over the party that published the state-
ment.' 73 The court explained that Basis "should not be permitted to
take advantage of modern technology through an Internet Web page
and forum and simultaneously escape traditional notions of
jurisdiction.' '1 74
Although all five courts arrived at the same result-exercising per-
sonal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based on Internet
contacts-each court reached this result using a different standard for
personal jurisdiction. The main difference between the approaches is
that the CompuServe, Zippo, Panavision, Edias, and Maritz courts fol-
lowed a deliberate availment approach similar to the Asahi plurality;
however, the District of Connecticut in Inset analyzed the contacts
based on anticipation of being haled into court rather than on whether
the defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum's laws.' 7 The
inconsistency of these approaches makes it difficult for a Web site op-
erator to know precisely what conduct will be sufficient to hale him
into a foreign jurisdiction's court. Curiously, these courts did not take
into account the nature of Internet communications when deciding
how to analyze the personal jurisdiction issue. All courts must take
into account the recent radical communicatory changes brought on by
168. I (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 (1985)).
169. Id
170. 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
171. Ia at 415.
172. See id at 417 (citing Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995));
supra note 146 and accompanying text.
173. Id at 422.
174. Id at 420.
175. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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the Internet to protect site operators, like Caitlin, from inconsistently
and unjustly being subject to jurisdiction in a foreign forum.'7 6
B. Cases Not Asserting Jurisdiction
Two recent decisions suggest that contact with the forum state via
the Internet is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. In
McDonough v. Fallon McElligott Inc,'" the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California declined to exercise ju-
risdiction based on the existence of a Web site alone. 178 McDonough
alleged that Fallon McElligott, a Minnesota advertising agency, repro-
duced his photographs for national publication without permission,
thereby constituting copyright infringement and unfair competition. 79
Plaintiff claimed that the existence of defendant's Web site suggested
that Fallon McElligott conducted business throughout the United
States, making the court's assertion of general jurisdiction appropri-
ate. The court, however, rejected this assertion, concluding:
Because the Web enables easy world-wide access, allowing com-
puter interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts... would
eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it currently ex-
ists; the Court is not willing to take this step. Thus, the fact that
Fallon has a Web site used by Californians cannot establish jurisdic-
tion by itself.'80
The court did not engage in a specific jurisdiction analysis based on
the existence of the Web site.
In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,'8s King, the operator of a
small Missouri jazz club called "The Blue Note," posted a site on the
Web to promote his club."s Bensusan, a New York corporation and
the creator of "The Blue Note" jazz club in New York City, sued King
for trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair
competition.'8
The minimum contacts portion of the court's due process analysis
looked at (1) purposeful availment; (2) reasonableness; and (3)
whether the defendant conducted a systematic and continuous part of
his general business within the forum state.18 This approach is similar
to the plurality's approach in Asahi, except that Bensusan adds a third
factor, the examination of whether the non-resident defendant con-
ducted a systematic and continuous part of his business within the fo-
176. See supra Introduction (describing hypothetical situation).
177. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
178. l at 1828.
179. Id at 1827.
180. Id at 1828.
181. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
182. Id at 297.
183. Id. at 297-98.
184. Id at 300-01.
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rum state. Yet, unlike the CompuServe, Zippo, Panavision, Edias, and
Maritz courts, which also applied an Asahi analysis, the Bensusan
court reached a different result.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted King's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion, holding that the existence of a site on the Web, without anything
more, is not sufficient to vest the court with personal jurisdiction over
a defendant pursuant to New York's long-arm statute and the Due
Process Clause.185 The court noted that it would take several affirma-
tive steps by a New York resident to access King's Web site, and "[t]he
mere fact that a person can gain information on the allegedly infring-
ing product is not the equivalent of a person advertising, promoting,
selling or otherwise making an effort to target its product in New
York.'18 6 The court also held that asserting jurisdiction over King
would violate the Due Process Clause:
King, like numerous others, simply created a Web site and permit-
ted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like plac-
ing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state.187
The court distinguished this case from CompuServe,188 in that there
were no allegations that King directed any contact to, or had any con-
tact with, New York or intended to purposely avail himself of any ben-
efits of New York.'89 In CompuServe, on the other hand, the
defendant specifically targeted Ohio by subscribing to CompuServe
and entering into the SRA with CompuServe.190
The court in Bensusan, like the courts that asserted jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants based on Internet conduct, chose its mini-
mum contacts test without regard to the unique circumstances it was
confronting.' 9' Because the court used a purposeful availment ap-
185. Id.
186. Id. at 299.
187. Id. at 301.
188. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
189. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
190. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264-65; Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
191. Other courts have asserted jurisdiction without directly analyzing the issue.
For example, in United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 74 (1996), the Sixth Circuit held that images transferred through an electronic
bulletin board service from California to Tennessee did not preclude prosecution for
interstate transportation of obscene materials. See id. at 706-07. The court explained
that the "manner in which the images moved does not affect their ability to be viewed
on a computer screen in Tennessee or their ability to be printed out in hard copy in
that distant location." Id. at 707. The court also explained that the defendants adver-
tised and promised obscene pictures to the bulletin board's members, and clearly in-
tended to conduct business in Tennessee. See id.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), Playboy sought to have Chuckleberry found in contempt of a previ-
ously awarded injunction which prevented Chuckleberry from, among other things,
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proach similar to that articulated by the Asahi plurality, the court de-
clined to exercise jurisdiction based solely on King's posting of an
Internet Web site. The purposeful availment approach prevented the
exercise of jurisdiction where King had no intention of serving the
New York community.
While the Bensusan court did not assert personal jurisdiction, the
Inset court reached the opposite conclusion based on a similar Web
site."9 In both cases, the defendant used its Web site for advertise-
ment.193 In fact, the differing results can be explained by the differ-
ence in the jurisdictional tests: The Bensusan court followed a
purposeful availment analysis, while the Inset court followed a reason-
able anticipation analysis.
Two main patterns of analysis have emerged from these Internet
jurisdictional cases. Some jurisdictions look at both purposeful avail-
ment and reasonableness, as does the Asahi plurality.19' In contrast,
other jurisdictions dispense with the availment requirement and, in-
stead, look at whether the defendant could anticipate being haled into
court in that jurisdiction. 195
The inconsistency of jurisdictional analyses from forum to forum
presents serious problems for Web site operators: A potential plaintiff
may take advantage of this inconsistency by commencing a lawsuit in
a forum with a more favorable jurisdictional policy. 96 Internet com-
munications are accessible worldwide to all users and Web site opera-
tors cannot control from where an individual accesses their sites. The
"distributing or selling in the United States... an English language male sophisticate
magazine which uses the word 'PLAYMEN' or any word confusingly similar there-
with." Id at 1034. Chuckleberry had created a Web site making available images of
its Italian "PLAYMEN" magazine. Id. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that the prohibition of the distribution or sale of
a magazine in the United States extends to distribution or sale over the Internet. Id. at
1038.
Both the Thomas and Playboy courts reached their decisions without using specific
jurisdictional tests, and accordingly differ from the cases that analyzed the defendants'
contacts. In Thomas, the contacts extended beyond the electronic contacts: The
defendants collected money from Tennessee. See Thomas, 74 F3d at 705. In Playboy,
Chuckleberry violated an injunction by establishing a Web site available in the United
States. Playboy, 939 F. Supp. at 1040.
192. See Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., No. Civ.A.96-397 Erie, 1997 WL
37657, at *5 (WI). Pa. Jan. 16, 1997).
193. See id. at *6.
194. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Zippo, 1997
WL 37657; Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz.
1996); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Maritz,
Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
195. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn.
1996); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351, 1352 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
196. This would most likely mean suing in a jurisdiction that either (1) conducts a
stream of commerce analysis, or (2) looks at whether a defendant could anticipate
being subject to lawsuit in the forum rather than whether a defendant intentionally
made his Web page available to the forum.
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nature of these communications mandates that courts apply a consis-
tent approach: the more stringent purposeful availment analysis.
IV. JURISDICTION FOR WEB SSES
Given the contrasting personal jurisdiction analyses from forum to
forum, Web site operators, who inevitably and unavoidably make con-
tact with every forum, may encounter difficulties arranging their sites
to avoid being haled into court by each forum's jurisdictional test. As
a result, site operators would be less likely to establish or maintain
active Web sites if they cannot determine how to design their Web
sites to avoid being subject to a foreign forum's jurisdiction. There-
fore, a uniform jurisdictional test that all forums would apply consist-
ently is necessary to provide site operators with a clear standard with
which their sites must comply. This part determines that a deliberate
availment approach will ensure the fairest results for site operators
throughout the nation.
A. Keeton and Justice Brennan's Asahi Approach Are
Inappropriate
Approaches that do not consider a plaintiff's purposeful availment
of a particular forum are inappropriate for Internet jurisdictional
cases because they under-analyze the nature of Internet communica-
tions. The approaches of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.197 and Jus-
tice Brennan in Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior Court'9 -under
which mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce would
satisfy the minimum contacts test' 99 -are inappropriate for Web juris-
dictional cases.
If courts followed Justice Brennan's approach, every Web site could
be subject to jurisdiction in every state because any active site could
be considered in the stream of commerce. To defeat jurisdiction, non-
resident defendants could argue only that haling them into court is
unreasonable. If applied to Internet jurisdictional cases, Justice Bren-
nan's analysis would be troublesome because the reasonableness as-
sessment is less predictable than deliberate availment and is not fully
within the control of the non-resident defendant.
197. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
198. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
199. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. After Asahi, many courts have
applied the stream of commerce test. See, e.g., Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 965
F.2d 1014, 1025 n.18. (11th Cir. 1992) (citing several district court cases that applied
the stream of commerce approach); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 943,
946-47 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting personal jurisdiction in products liability action using
"the more permissive stream of commerce theory" and stating that "[t]his Circuit has
repeatedly endorsed the 'stream of commerce theory' and has resolved cases on the
basis of it"); Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 385-86 (5th Cir.
1989) (adopting stream of commerce approach as "embraced" by the Fifth Circuit).
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Using Justice Brennan's approach would eliminate the crucial step
of looking at the non-resident defendant's intent when he published
information on a Web site. Even a defendant like King in Bensusan,
who had no intention of entertaining New York jazz enthusiasts, could
be forced to defend a New York lawsuit merely because his Web page
was available to all Internet users nationwide and thus released into
the stream of commerce. Similarly, a defendant like Caitlin, who had
no intention of selling flowers to individuals outside of a local area,
could be haled into court in a distant jurisdiction.200 This result could
reduce growth of the Internet because merely establishing a Web site
that is, like all Web sites, nationally accessible, could render the de-
fendant site operator susceptible to jurisdiction. The site operator
could only argue that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
thereby leaving the question for the trial judge to determine on a case-
by-case basis.
The outcomes of Internet jurisdictional cases may hinge on how
federal courts, and perhaps the Supreme Court, interpret Keeton.20' It
would be inappropriate, however, to apply the principles of Keeton to
Web jurisdictional cases because the Keeton approach endorses the
stream of commerce approach. 2  One commentator has stated: "If
the courts see the dissemination of information through Web sites as
akin to the distribution of magazines, they would likely rely on the
Hustler case to give plaintiffs free reign in picking where to sue Web
site operators.120 3
Internet-related jurisdictional cases are not analogous to Keeton,
however, which involved a nationally-distributed magazine. While
magazine publishers can affirmatively decide not to sell or distribute
their magazines in certain forums, this option is not possible for Web
site providers-even password access does not discriminate based on
the jurisdiction from which the user is calling. This is because the user
who possesses a password can access a password-protected Web site
by dialing into the Internet from anywhere in the world-the Internet
does not distinguish users by the location from where the call
originates.
Applying either Keeton or Justice Brennan's Asahi approach to
these cases would result in devastating effects. First, forum shop-
ping would be rampant: Aplaintif could choose virtually any juris-
diction in the United States2° because Web sites are accessible across
200. See supra Introduction (describing hypothetical situation).
201. Price, supra note 102, at A4.
202. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781.
203. 1&
204. The Supreme Court has discouraged forum shopping. See Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
205. There would generally have to be some connection between the forum and the
cause of action, but because Web sites are accessible in every jurisdiction, this would
probably not be too difficult to establish.
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the country.206 As a result, plaintiffs would select jurisdictions, among
otherwise available forums, that have plaintiff-friendly policies2" 7-
due process limitations on personal jurisdiction would be no discour-
agement to choosing these advantageous jurisdictions. Second, it
would be unfair to subject defendants to a court's unpredictable deter-
mination of whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.20 8
Finally, uncertainty would diminish incentives of site operators to ex-
pand their Web sites, and may lead eventually to decreased Web us-
age.209 If site operators are subject to even a few minority forums
with unfavorable personal jurisdiction analyses, they would be less
likely to establish or continue to operate their Web sites.
Further, if Keeton's principles were applied, fewer jurisdictions
would adjudicate these disputes. Plaintiffs would choose jurisdictions
with more advantageous jurisdictional analyses-like the stream of
commerce approach-and would always be able to because defend-
ants would, in effect, be everywhere. Thus, defendants may consist-
ently have a more difficult jurisdictional battle than in the plaintiffs' or
defendants' home forum. Moreover, applying Keeton's analysis would
be burdensome for defendants, forcing them to defend lawsuits in ju-
risdictions where no contacts exist other than plaintiffs' access to the
Internet site. There would not only be more difficulties in defending
such a suit, but Web site operators would suffer the inconvenient con-
sequence of traveling to a forum with no real connection to the al-
leged dispute between the parties.210
206. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (describing the capacity of Web users in the United States to
browse Web sites).
207. In a libel action, for example, plaintiffs could use the "single publication rule"
to recover damages from the alleged libel throughout the United States. Cf. Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-75 (explaining a situation where the plaintiff
chose a forum because of its longer statute of limitations).
208. In addition to forcing non-resident site operators to travel to remote jurisdic-
tions, the stream of commerce approach would decrease site operators' ability to pre-
dict when they could be haled into court in a foreign forum-any Web conduct would
satisfy the stream of commerce approach-so these site operators would be left with a
foreign forum's subjective determination of reasonableness.
209. There are numerous advantages to increased Web usage. See Giorgio Bovenzi,
Liabilities of System Operators on the Internet, 11 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 93, 95-96 (1996)
(explaining that interests in encouraging Internet growth should be taken into account
in Internet tort cases); Clive Whitfield-Jones & Susan Post, Netscape 2.0: What's in It
for Law Firms?, Marketing for Law., June, 1996, at 1, 7 (describing the advantageous
global reach to Internet marketing for lawyers).
210. While forum non-conveniens, which permits dismissals of cases on the grounds
of inconvenient venue, may provide some check on personal jurisdiction, it is not
commonly applied in federal courts. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 27-28. Furthermore,
courts would not find exercising jurisdiction unreasonable because the non-resident
defendant would be forced travel as far as across the country. See Sher v. Johnson, 911
F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In this era of fax machines and discount air travel,
[requiring the non-resident defendant) to [travel from Florida and) defend itself in
California under the circumstances as it alleges them would not be so unreasonable as
to violate due process."); Williams Elec. Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 854 F.2d 389, 393
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B. The Nature of Web Communications Mandates Using a
Purposeful Availment Analysis
Site operators establish their Web sites for a variety of reasons and
purposes.2 " Operators target different individuals and markets with
their Web sites. To protect these site operators, a deliberate availment
approach must be employed when analyzing whether to assert per-
sonal jurisdiction over Internet activity. This approach, however,
must differentiate between intentional decisions to conduct business
with members of given (or all) forums and awareness that the site is
available throughout the world. If a site operator does not make a
business decision-through advertising or selling products on the In-
ternet, for example-then the contacts must be carefully analyzed for
intentional and purposeful availment. Mere foreseeability of the pos-
sibility of being haled into a forum, alone, should not suffice to assert
jurisdiction.
1. Courts Should Follow Justice O'Connor's Asahi Approach
Courts determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over a Web site
operator should apply a uniform analysis. All courts should apply Jus-
tice O'Connor's deliberate availment approach, as articulated in
Asahi, when deciding whether publishing on a Web site is sufficient to
exercise jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. 2  This focus will
allow courts to consider the more difficult issue facing them, namely,
how properly to evaluate conduct on the Web for jurisdictional
purposes.
The Due Process Clause provides potential defendants with predict-
ability so that they can structure their conduct with at least some cer-
tainty as to where that conduct will and will not subject them to
suit.21 3 Web site operators function in an environment with little
awareness of the jurisdictional reach of their communications, and,
more specifically, with little appreciation of the likelihood of being
subject to a lawsuit in any particular forum. These communications
(11th Cir. 1988) ("Although the defendants would be compelled to travel to Florida
[from Texas] to defend this lawsuit, modem improvements in transportation and com-
munication significantly lessen this hardship (citing World-Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1980))). Courts have held that, in this modem age, it
is not unduly burdensome to require defendants to travel to other parts of the country
to defend a lawsuit; in reality, however, the inconvenience and added expense of
travel, especially for an individual with a personal Web site rather than a large corpo-
ration, can be enormous.
211. See supra part I.C.
212. The analysis in this section focuses on instances where jurisdiction is appropri-
ate under the state's long-arm statute when that statute imposes further limitations
beyond the Due Process Clause. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text. This
analysis applies to actions in state and federal jurisdictions, both of which must ensure
that exercising jurisdiction comports with due process. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 249-50 (1958).
213. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
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are often sent out to the entire Web community, and not directed at
any particular city, state, or even country. A site operator like Caitlin,
who aspires to use her Web site to sell flowers to her local customers,
often does not contemplate that others would access or be interested
in her site.214 This is why the "nature and quality of contacts" pro-
vided by maintaining an Internet Web site are "clearly of a different
nature and quality" than other types of contact with a forum state.215
The nature of communications on the Web, and the fact that Web
sites may not be created for a particular community, mandates that
courts be particularly careful not to blindly force Web site operators
to defend lawsuits in foreign jurisdictions solely because the site oper-
ators were aware that their communications could reach a particular
forum. Courts must determine whether Web publishing occurring
outside of the forum state is intentionally directed toward that state so
that it does not offend due process.216 This determination is best ef-
fectuated by the test set forth in the Asahi plurality opinion written by
Justice O'Connor.217 To subject a non-resident site operator to juris-
diction, Justice O'Connor's approach would require both that the de-
fendant operator deliberately direct the communication over the Web
to the forum state, and that exercising jurisdiction, given the circum-
stances of the case, would be reasonable.21 8
Using Asahi's stringent requirements to carefully analyze the con-
tacts to or from a Web site would ensure that Web site operators are
not subject to jurisdiction in any forum simply because they published
information on the Web. Web site operators need some assurance
that simply publishing on the Web will not be sufficient to subject
them to suit without some intention to reach a particular forum.
The current Internet jurisdictional case law, which is certainly in its
infancy, 219 has generally followed this reasoning. When deciding
whether conduct over the Internet is sufficient to confer jurisdiction,
however, courts are following the precedent used for all jurisdictional
214. See supra Introduction (describing hypothetical situation).
215. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
216. Cynthia L. Counts & C. Amanda Martin, Libel in Cyberspace: A Framework
for Addressing Liability and Jurisdictional Issues in This New Frontier, 59 Alb. L. Rev.
1083, 1126 (1996).
217. The Asahi plurality concluded that the mere placement of products into the
stream of commerce by a non-resident defendant is not an act purposefully directed at
the forum state and that there must be additional conduct directed at that state. Asahi
Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). Justice O'Connor articu-
lated a test that, ten years after its creation, is well-suited to Web sites where all
published information, by existing on the Web, is arguably in the stream of commerce.
See id. The deliberate availment approach ensures that mere placement of a site on
the Web will not alone be sufficient for a forum to exercise jurisdiction over a non-
resident. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
218. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-16.
219. See Zippo Mfg. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., No. Civ.A.96-397 Erie, 1997 WL
37657, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1997).
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cases in that particular forum and, thus, using their forum's minimum
contacts test. While most of the scant number of courts considering
Internet jurisdictional issues have required both availment and rea-
sonableness like Asahi, others have focused on the defendant's expec-
tation of being sued in a particular forum z2 ° Because a plurality of
the Court enumerated the purposeful availment test in Asahi, courts
are not bound to follow it, and can structure their jurisdictional test
without it. Such departures from Asahi's purposeful availment test,
however, are ill-suited to Internet cases, and will result in great uncer-
tainty and threaten the development of a growing section of the na-
tional/global economy.
All courts should follow the Asahi plurality approach to ensure uni-
formity in the jurisdictional analysis for the same publishing on the
Web. Use of this test would ensure that one action-making informa-
tion available on a Web page, which inevitably and automatically
places the site operator in potential or actual contact with every forum
in the world-would be similarly evaluated when different jurisdic-
tions decided questions of personal jurisdiction.
2. Advantages of the Asahi Purposeful Availment/Reasonableness
Approach
Both prongs of the Asahi plurality test should be used to decide
jurisdictional questions for communications over the Web. This ap-
proach, which first determines purposeful availment and next exam-
ines the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, would appropriately
balance the interests of potential plaintiff Web users and defendant
Web site operators.
a. Purposeful Availment
Purposeful availment, as understood by the Asahi plurality, requires
a Web site operator to have more than mere awareness of the interna-
tional scope of the Internet before it will allow a court to exercise
jurisdiction over that operator.2 1 As the court in Bensusan stated,
"mere foreseeability of an in-state consequence and a failure to avert
that consequence is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction."n
Simply operating a Web site is not sufficient to subject an operator
to jurisdiction. The Bensusan court established that floor: "Creating
a site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt
220. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
221. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (ED. Mo. 1996)
(holding that only when a company creates a Web site with the intention of reaching
all Internet users, and reaches individuals in a forum, can personal jurisdiction be
exercised over a defendant without regard to his physical location).
222. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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nationwide-or even worldwide-but, without more, it is not an act
purposefully directed toward the forum state."'
Certain on-line conduct is more likely to lead the site operator to
defend suits in certain forums. If a corporation advertises2 4 on the
Web, for example, courts will likely exercise jurisdiction. 5 Jurisdic-
tion is proper when a corporation's (or individual's) advertisement in-
tends to reach a certain audience. If the advertiser limits the audience
to whom it is communicating, the probability of the advertiser being
subject to suit in any forum should decrease. Once an advertiser con-
ducts business with an individual in a particular forum based on a Web
advertisement, however, that advertiser would easily pass the pur-
poseful availment test.2 6
Another circumstance where the purposeful availment prong is eas-
ily satisfied is when out-of-state conduct intends to, and does, cause
harmful effects in the forum state?2 7 Courts will exercise jurisdiction
for tortious conduct on the Web directed at a particular person or
place because courts will confer jurisdiction for this sort of conduct
conducted in any medium.22 Additionally, courts will probably exer-
cise jurisdiction when a Web site operator advertises to a nationwide
audience and benefits nationally from that advertisement; in this case,
it can be assumed that the advertisement directed at the national mar-
ket qualifies as purposeful availment.
The purposeful availment prong will not be satisfied when a Web
site does not target a forum and the site operator does not benefit
from the site's availability in a particular market.229 Thus, use of the
purposeful availment prong in all jurisdictions would enable site oper-
ators to create Web sites without constant fear of litigation in a foreign
forum.
223. Id at 301 (citing the plurality opinion from Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)).
224. For this analysis, advertising means promoting or selling a product on the
Internet.
225. See, e.g., Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (holding that once an advertisement is placed on the Internet, the continuous
availability of that advertisement, as well as the fact that it is directed to all states,
supports a finding that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the laws of Con-
necticut); Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (holding that consciously deciding to advertise
to all Internet users, with knowledge that the information will be globally transmitted,
favors exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant).
226. See Zippo Mlfg. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., No. Civ.A.96-397 Erie, 1997 WL
37657, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 1997); supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text
(discussing Zippo).
227. See, e.g., Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420
(D. Ariz. 1996) (explaining that posting allegedly defamatory statements on the Web
indicates purposeful availment of the forum state); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen,
938 F. Supp. 616, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (asserting jurisdiction when the defendant's
conduct "intended to, and did, result in harmful effects in California").
228. See Edias, 947 F. Supp. at 420; Panavision, 938 F. Supp. at 622.
229. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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b. Reasonableness
Establishing jurisdiction over a Web site for its existence alone
would be unreasonable, and would not comport with the notion of
"fair play and substantial justice."' 0 Although most, if not all, Web
site operators are aware of the national scope of their Web sites, this
knowledge does not necessarily make it reasonable for a court to exer-
cise jurisdiction. A Web site operator cannot limit access to his site. 3 1
Because awareness alone is not sufficient for a court to exercise juris-
diction over a Web site operator, 2 it would be unreasonable to exer-
cise jurisdiction over operators who may not have intended residents
of given states to use or benefit from their sites.13
Although a site operator can use sophisticated password programs
to allow only authorized users to explore the Web site,2-  these pass-
word programs only allow certain users to access the Web site, and
cannot distinguish among the locations of particular Web users.2-5
Without the uncommon use of password programs, an Internet user
can access an operator's Web site from any jurisdiction in the world.2 3
Additionally, the international scope of Web pages should not be used
230. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
231. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
("Any internet user can access any website, of which there are presumably hundreds
of thousands, by entering into the computer the internet address they are seeking.");
see also Shea ex reL Am. Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(explaining that an Internet provider "has no way of identifying the receiving
community").
232. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
233. Site operators may be unaware of the jurisdictions from which people are ac-
cessing their sites. See Perritt, supra note 1, at 23 ("In the Web often the information
is transmitted indirectly .... sometimes without the knowledge of the person making
the information object available.").
234. This option is used primarily for premium sites, similar to premium channels
for cable subscribers, where site operators require passwords to access the Web site
and distribute passwords to paying customers. Most Web sites are accessible to users
with or without a password, and requiring Web users to type in a password before
entering a Web site does not help promote the site because Web users normally ex-
pect the free-flow of information.
235. As long as an individual has an Internet account, that user can dial into the
account from anywhere there is a phone jack. The account functions identically re-
gardless of the location from where the user is calling. Thus, an individual with a
password to a Web site can access that site from anywhere in the world where there is
access to a telephone line.
236. An Internet user can prevent access to particular Web sites-normally ob-
scene Web pages-by using a variety of commercial software programs that block
access to certain sites. Each Internet user, however, must decide to buy and install
these software packages. Thus, affirmative steps are required by the user to block
access to certain sites; this is similar to when an individual decides to subscribe to a
magazine. Furthermore, many of these software packages will block out only "ob-
scene" materials rather than any materials a Web user may want to avoid. See Steve
Wildstrom & Toddi Gutner, Cybersmut How to Lock Out the Kids, Bus. Wk., Feb.
12, 1996, at 98-99 (describing Internet screening software); Steve Lohr, Practicing
Safety on the Internet, N.Y. Tunes, Sept. 21, 1995, at Cl (same).
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to justify unreasonably dragging Internet site operators to defend law-
suits in any jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Cyberspace presents new and exciting legal challenges. Courts
must carefully apply the appropriate existing legal doctrines when de-
ciding personal jurisdiction issues based on Web activity. While, of
course, each case should be analyzed individually, purposeful avail-
ment and expectation should be emphasized instead of mere knowl-
edge that the information will be accessible in the forum state. Use of
this analysis would prevent Internet activity on the Web from being
considered sufficient for personal jurisdiction. If any Web activity
were considered sufficient, Internet users would inevitably always be
at the mercy of plaintiffs' forum selections.
